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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
vailing . . . that any property right, not necessarily personal, is
assignable, is overcome by agreement of the contracting parties
. .. " Thus, the rule that parties may prohibit the assignment
of contract rights by mutual agreement has long been recognized
in dictum in New York, 4"and where the prohibition is for the sole
benefit of the obligor the assignment has been held void.47 The
tendency, however, has been to treat the clause as relating to the
delegation of performance alone,48 unless the assignee has actual
notice of the restriction. 9 Clear and unequivocal language is
required to lead to the conclusion that the rights are not assignable. 0 The general rule is recognized by the Restatement."'
The court in the instant case found the terms of the restrictive
clause sufficiently clear to indicate an intent that any assignment
of rights was ineffectual and void. A new section to the Uniform
Commercial Code52 is intended to deny effect to any agreement
prohibiting the assignment of accounts and contract rights (including sums due and to become due) under contracts of sale,
construction and the like. It would overrule the present case.
Arbitration
Arbitration agreements are often inexpensive and expeditious
means for settling future disputes between parties to a contract.
In Akpert v. Admiration Knitware,5 the plaintiff (buyer) petitioned for an order directing the defendant (seller) to submit to
arbitration issues alleged to be in controversy. Beside containing
an arbitration clause, 4 the contract provided that if in the sole
46. Devlin v. Mayor of New York, 63 N. Y. 8 (1875).
47. Fortunatov. Patton, 147 N. Y. 277, 281 (1895).
48. 2 WnsIuSoK, op. cit. § 442.
49. Snyder v. City of New York, 74 App. Div. 421, 77 N. Y. Supp. 637 (1st Dep't

1902).

50. State Bank v. Central Mercantile Bank, 248 N. Y. 428, 435, 162 N. E. 475,

477 (1928).
151. RESTATEMENT, op. cit. § 151: "A right may be the subject of effective assign-

ment unless . . . (c)the assignment is prohibited by the contract creating the right."
52. UmnoP.m CoXMERCAL CODE-SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 9-318 (1952) : "(4) A term
prohibiting assignment of an account or contract right is ineffectual." Section 151
of the RESTATEMENT, supra n. 51, mentions nothing indicating that agreements making
wages non-assignable are any different from agreements making other rights non-assignable. Section 9-318 (4) of the CoxmacrcA. CoDE would make ineffectual any agreement
prohibiting the assignment of rights even as against an assignee with actual notice.
53. 304 N. Y. 1, 105 N. E. 2d 561 (1952).
54. The arbitration clause provided that: "All other controversies arising out of
or relating to this contract, or breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration
304 N. Y. at 5,105 N. E. 2d at 563.
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opinion of the defendant the plaintiff's financial responsibility was
unsatisfactory, cash payments in advance of deliveries might be
required, and upon plaintiff's failure to make such advances, the
defendant might terminate the contract. The defendant gave
written notice to the plaintiff demanding such payments and stat-"
ing that failure to comply within eight days would be deemed
abandonment. The plaintiff failed to comply. The Appellate Division (3-2) held 55 that there was an arbitrable issue whether the
parties intended the defendant's right of termination to be absolute or conditioned upon a showing of good faith. However, the
Court of Appeals, (6-1) held that the unequivocal language gave
the defendant an absolute power of termination and that the record clearly showed that the contract was no longer in existence,
and that therefore no issue remained for arbitration.
A proceeding to enforce arbitration presupposes the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate at the time the remedy is
sought.5 6 But whether the defense that the agreement has been
terminated prior to the petition for arbitratio is in.itself an issue
included within the .arbitration clause is not free fiom difficulty.
Upon petition for an order directing arbitration, only two issues
are within the jurisdiction of the court: 5 (1) the making of the
agreement to arbitrate, (2) the failure to comply therewith. All
other disputes, if within the scope of the arbitration clause 8
must proceed to arbitration, including both questions of law and
fact." Whether the particular dispute falls within the scope of
the arbitration clause depends upon the intention of the parties as
expressed therein.60 However, the mere assertion of a dispute
may be so frivolous and contrary to the plain meaning of the
words of the agreement that the court will refuse to order the parties to proceed to arbitration, even though the alleged dispute
may fall within the literal language of the arbitration clause.6
55. 278 App. Div. 841, 104 N. Y. S. 2d 309 (2nd Dep't 1951).
56. Matter of Kramer & Uchitelle, 288 N. Y. 467, 471, 42 N. E. 2d 493, 495 (1942);
Finsilver, Still & Moss v. Goldberg M. & Co., 253 N. Y. 382, 171 N. E. 579 (1930).

57. N. Y. C.P. A. § 1449.
58. Matter of Eagar Const. Corp. v. Ward Foundation Corp., 255 App. Div. 291,
7 N. Y. S. 2d 450 (Ist Dep't 1938).
59. Matter of Wenger & Co. v. Propper S. H. Mills, 239 N. Y. 199, 146 N. E.
203 (1924).
60. Matter of Aqua Mfg. Co., Inc. (Warshow & Sons. Inc.), 179 Misc. 949, 40
N. Y. S. 2d 564, aff'd without opinion, 266 App. Div. 718, 41 N. Y. S. 2d 935, appeal
denied, 266 App. Div. 767, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 917 (1943). Compare Matter of Kramer &
Uchitelle, supra n. 56 with Matter of Lipman v. Haenser Shellac Co., 289 N. Y. 76,
43 N. E. 2d 817 (1942). See, Application of Minin, 279 App. Div. 226, 108 N. Y. S.
2d 945 (2nd Dept 1951).
61. Matter of International.4ss'n. of Machiniss, (Cutler-Hammer, Inc.), 275 App.
Div. 917, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 317, aff'd, 297 N. Y. 519, 74 N. E. 2d 464 (1947).
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Thus, whether or no a bona fide dispute exists is a question of law
for the courts.62
Jurisdiction of the court to determine whether a dispute is
frivolous or not is not provided for in section 1449 of the Civil
Practice Act. The language of the arbitration clause in the instant case would seem broad enough to include such issues.
Interpretation
In Moeller v. Associated Hospital Serve 3 the plaintiff
sought to recover for hospital expenses under a "Blue Cross" hospital insurance policy issued by the defendant. The policy expressly excluded for coverage hospital service "provide- for
under any compensation law . . ." The plaintiff had been injured in the course of employment, and his hospital bills were
paid by his employer's compensation carrier. Thereafter, the
plaintiff began suit against the third party tort-feasor which resulted in a settlement. The compensation carrier enforced its
lien upon the settlement for the amount paid upon plaintiff's com64
pensation claim.
The present action was submitted to the Appellate Division
upon an agreed statement of facts. The plaintiff contends that his
hospital expenses were not within the meaning of the exclusion
clause of the policy. The Appellate Division allowed recovery
upon the ground that when the compensation carrier was reimbursed, it no longer provided hospital service under the compensation statutes, since by reimbursement the services were actually
"provided" by someone else.6 5 The Court of Appeals, three
judges dissenting, found that the hospital services were provided
for by the Workumen's Compensation Law since the "plaintiff
never lost the protection of the Statute with respect to hospital
services." ' , The majority also found that any other construction
62. Matter of General Elec. Co. (United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers), 300 N. Y.
262, 90 N. E. 2d 181 (1949).
63. 304 N. Y. 73, 106 N. E. 2d 16 (1952).
64. N. Y. WoRxmEN'S Co-mP. LAW §29 (1). This section gives the carrier a
hen on the proceeds of any settlement to the extent of the amount of compensation
provided and goes on to state that any recovery shall be deemed for the benefit of the
carrier.
65. 278 App. Div. 723, 103 N. Y. S. 2d 116 (3rd Dep't 1951).
66. The court stated: "If he did not prevail in the third-party action, he nevertheless retained the benefits of the hospital expenses furnished by the employer's insurance
carrier; if he did prevail, he likewise retained these benefits, but the third-party wrongdoer, not plaintiff, had to reimburse the carrier. While plaintiff was entitled to sue
for these expenses, it was on behalf of the carrier, and the law gave the carrier a lien
therefor. He could never recover these medical expenses for himself; they belonged
under the statute to the carrier." 304 N. Y. at 75, 106 N. E. 2d at 17.

